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Assessing the Probability of Patients Reoffending After 
Discharge from Low to Medium Secure Forensic Mental 
Health Services: 
An Inductive Prevention Paradox 
 
Bob Heyman, Paul M. Godin, Lisa Reynolds and 
Jacqueline P. Davies 
 
Abstract 
 
Citizens of developed societies are troubled by those who commit ‘irrational’ 
crimes against the person. Reoffending after release from secure mental health 
services triggers particularly intense angst when amplified by media and political 
scrutiny. However, forensic mental health service providers making discharge 
decisions are required to predict the probability of patients reoffending after 
discharge by observing behaviour in secure institutional settings designed 
specifically to prevent such transgressions from occurring. This paper will explore 
this ‘inductive prevention paradox’ by drawing on data drawn from qualitative 
studies undertaken in two medium to low secure UK institutions, one providing 
forensic mental health and the other forensic learning disability services. The 
views of 56 staff members and 21 patients about risk management in forensic 
services were explored, and an additional 25 staff interviews were undertaken for 
case studies of these patients. Data analysis focussed on patient and staff 
responses to the inductive prevention paradox with respect to a highly sensitive 
issue. The wider applicability of this framework will be considered in the 
Discussion. It will be argued that the prognostic limitations arising from the 
inductive prevention paradox have been underestimated by policy-makers and in 
official inquiries; and that the prevailing personal risk assessment framework 
needs to be complemented by greater attention to the environments which 
patients will be discharged into.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mulvey had put on a penitent face and given a series of 
small humble nods. He knew the Governor and the 
Visiting Committee were watching from the gallery and 
he wanted to make an enduring impression. (O’Connor, 
2006, p. 196) 
 
Mulvey, the fictional nineteenth century prisoner mentioned in the opening 
citation, establishes trustee status in order to engineer his escape from a harsh 
19th century Benthamite prison, brutally murdering a guard in the process. The 
present paper will explore an analogous issue, that of assessing the risk of  
serious reoffending by patients released from secure forensic mental health 
services. It will be argued that staff charged with managing this risk face the 
‘inductive prevention paradox’i (Heyman et al., 2010, p. 103-104). The paradox 
arises whenever measures designed to reduce or eliminate a risk are 
implemented. An unwanted but inescapable consequence of adopting 
preventative measures is that risk reduction obscures direct observation of what 
might have happened if prophylaxis had not been attempted. In relation to the 
topic of the present paper, the probability of an in-patient causing harm to 
members of the public after discharge from a secure institutions has to be 
estimated from observations made in an environment designed precisely to 
prevent such events from occurring. Put simply, because patients who are locked 
up cannot assault members of the public, the probability of them doing so if 
discharged becomes difficult to assess. The question of whether a detained 
forensic mental health patient would reoffend if released cannot be definitively 
answered through direct observation except by accepting this risk.  
 
The wider implications of the inductive prevention paradox will be touched on in 
the Discussion. The data analysis presented below will be concerned with risk 
assessment in relation to the possible discharge of offenders from secure mental 
health services, an important practice and policy issue in itself, but also an 
illustrative example of the inductive prevention paradox. The analysis will focus 
on staff and patient recognition, if any, and responses to this issue. The 
remainder of the Introduction will address three relevant background issues: 
firstly, the societal attitudes which render reoffending by discharged offenders 
from mental health services as unacceptable risk; secondly, the UK history of 
medium to low secure forensic mental health services as a response to the 
inductive prevention paradox; and, thirdly, attempts to ‘beat the trap’ arising from 
the inductive prevention paradox through the use of psychometric actuarial 
methods. It will be argued that neither moving closed institutions closer to ‘the 
community’ nor resorting to psychometrics offers a plausible route to accurately 
quantifying the probabilities of discharged patients reoffending. However, staff 
who have to take decisions despite such epistemological limitations face public 
ignominy if a recently discharged patient reoffends. This analysis sets the scene 
 3
for considering how staff and patients view and attempt to manage this 
conundrum.  
 
Societal attitudes to the risk of reoffending by forensic mental health 
patients 
 
Risk management for individuals who commit serious offences against the 
person attracts strong media and political attention in the UK and elsewhereii 
despite the rarity of such crimes. Concern becomes especially heated when the 
offence is perceived as ‘dirty’, as in the case of sexual assault, particularly on 
children, or as driven by an ‘irrational’ motive, i.e. a belief system which the 
prevailing culture views as delusory. In contrast, more frequent causes of death 
and injury, for example those caused by traffic accidents, and even ‘rational’ 
offences against the person such as assaults inflicted during bank robberies, 
attract much less societal angst. The release of offenders who have committed 
irrational or dirty crimes and subsequently reoffend exponentially intensifies the 
already powerful threat to the social order arising from the identification of 
irrational and therefore unpredictable assaults. The perpetrator has not only 
exposed the dangerously erratic nature of human behaviour. In addition, society 
has registered such disturbing transgressions, but has failed to prevent them 
from reoccurring. The present paper is not primarily concerned with explaining 
societal attitudes to ‘irrational’ or ‘dirty’ offences per se, but rather with the 
implications of their intense unacceptability for risk assessment and 
management. The separation of the mentally disordered offender from modern 
society is now accounted for in terms of a utilitarian risk management framework 
even though powerful resonances of cultural pollution remain. At the same time, 
the difficulty of predicting individual behaviour make avoidance of reoffending 
difficult or impossible to achieve.  
 
A brief history of UK medium to low secure forensic mental health services 
 
UK forensic mental health services with lower levels of security than that 
provided in the established high security hospitals were originally conceived of 
with just the issue of realistic risk assessment in mind. In the terminology 
developed above, the main aim underpinning the design of these new services 
was tackling the inductive prevention paradox. The idea originated in the work of 
The Butler Committee (Home Office and Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1975). Their report reviewed the discharge of mentally disordered 
offenders in the aftermath of the notorious case of Graham Young who had been 
confined to a high security special hospital after poisoning members of his family. 
Young was released despite having overtly developed his poisoning skills during 
his hospital stay, borrowing many library books on this topic. He subsequently 
poisoned a number of work colleagues, causing media uproar. Butler identified 
systematic failure to recognise patients’ propensities to reoffend in the remote, 
esoteric environments of special hospitals.  
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At the time when the Butler Report was published, in 1975, risk assessment was 
a new and relatively unused procedure (Tidmarsh, 1992). In terms of the risk 
social science which emerged subsequently, it can be argued that the 
organisation of high secure institutions could generate selective perception to the 
point of risk blindness, with tragic but also blackly comic consequences, 
epitomised by the Graham Young case. Despite the report’s recommendations 
being widely publicised, only a few institutions providing medium to low secure 
accommodation were opened in the 1970s and 1980s, perhaps because state 
funding was not provided. After another national UK report offering a similar 
analysis had been published (Reed, 1992), such intermediate security facilities 
began to be established on a large-scale. However, the number of mentally 
disordered offenders detained in UK high security institutions has declined only 
moderately, remaining at over 1000 since the early nineties, whilst the number 
confined in medium to low security hospitals has increased from about 1000 in 
1993 to over 2000 in 2003 (Ly and Howard, 2004). Reed presented the benefits 
of the latter in terms of them providing a half-way house between the high-
security hospital and the community where patients could be observed and 
assessed in a more appropriate setting without putting the public at risk. Hence, 
one of the aims behind their expansion in the 1990s was to provide a more 
revealing environment for risk assessment in relation to the communities to which 
patients would eventually return. The finding that nurses’ negative stereotyping 
and therapeutic pessimism about patients is associated with security level 
(Mason et al., 2010) suggests that they can offer a more hopeful environment for 
patient rehabilitation. However, as will be documented in the Data Analysis 
section, staff charged with critical decision-making about discharge may not 
share the view that the probability of a patient reoffending can be validly 
assessed within the confines of medium and low security units.  
 
Cases of serious reoffending by patients recently discharged from medium to low 
security institutions have inevitably occurred. A number of UK formal inquiries 
conducted retrospectively have explained such reoffending in terms of culpable 
service failures of communication and risk assessment. For instance, an inquiry 
into a killing perpetrated by a patient, John Barrett, one day after release from a 
medium secure unit (South West London Strategic Health Authority, 2006) 
criticised forensic mental health service providers for becoming too sympathetic 
to risky patients. As illustrated below, patients and staff who participated in the 
present research made a similar point when they argued that compliant patients 
could progress quickly through the system to discharge simply because they did 
not cause immediate problems. Nevertheless, careful analysis of the information 
available to service providers challenges the assumption underpinning the 2006 
inquiry report that patient reoffending can be unproblematically predicted 
providing that staff try hard enough. 
 
It might be suggested that this tragedy would not have occurred if it had not 
been for a single decision, to allow John Barrett out on leave from the 
medium secure psychiatric unit to which he had been readmitted on the day 
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before he killed Denis Finnegan … Too much confidence was placed in 
clinical judgements unsupported by evidence and rigorous analysis. (South 
West London Strategic Health Authority, 2006, p.9) 
 
Once it is assumed that service providers possess the capacity to accurately 
predict whether individuals will reoffend, it follows that their apparent failure to do 
so must arise from individual or organisational inadequacies deserving of 
censure. This interpretive framework thus transforms probability assessment into 
a moral issue. However, as well as discounting the inductive prevention paradox, 
such a perspective ignores the key limitation of probabilistic reasoning which, 
even if it can be based on induction from an adequate set of observations, is 
predicated on the assumption that the occurrence of adverse events is at least 
possible. The mindset documented above elides the (attempted) accurate 
calibration of probabilities with perfect prognostication. Staff thereby face a 
double shortfall with respect to meeting societal expectations based on the 
implicit assumptions that the chance of an individual reoffending can be 
measured, and that this metric somehow enables perfect prediction. 
 
Confined to an institution where their riskiness is continually assessed, patients 
may react to being placed under constant observation. They may seek to please 
their clinicians in the hope of gaining more autonomy by reducing their assessed 
riskiness. Conversely, patients may ‘fake bad’, attempting to increase their official 
riskiness in order to invoke a therapeutic response, maintain self-esteem or 
postpone feared discharge, a phenomenon which insiders sometimes depict as 
‘gate fever’ (Godin et al., 2006, p. 87). In turn, clinicians may attempt to deceive 
in the hope of seeing through the camouflage of self-presentation so as to 
uncover a presumed psychological reality, revelation of which will allow the risk 
of reoffending to be accurately assessed.  
 
Service providers and users who live with this situation are likely to appreciate 
the problems arising from the inductive prevention paradox, an awareness 
documented in the Data Analysis section. The following sub-section offers an 
analysis of attempts to predict an individual’s probability of reoffending by means 
of formal risk assessment ‘instruments’. Their use is mostly complemented by  
multidisciplinary qualitative reviews of individual cases (Shaw et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, critical analysis of the epistemology underpinning psychometric 
risk assessment can offer insights into the limitations of probabilistic inference in 
this context, consideration of which can be obscured by pragmatic imperatives 
and routinisation. 
 
Risk assessment ‘tools’ 
 
The process of discharge decision-making for forensic mental health service-
users is organised around case conferences and the use of risk assessment 
inventories, often called ‘tools’ by health service insiders, although 
recommendations must, in most cases, be externally ratified. The routinisation of 
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tool usage, a core feature of UK National Health Service culture, tends to conceal 
their shaky epistemological foundations (Webb, 2012). Those used in forensic 
mental health services contain sets of items on which patients are rated, 
generating summative scores designed to indicate a patient’s probability of 
reoffending after discharge.iii Analysis of their limitations sheds light on the 
predictive difficulties arising from the inductive prevention paradox. 
 
Such tools can be divided into three types (Gray et al., 2004). Actuarial measures 
are based on easily encoded biographical information covering offending history 
and demographic factors inductively associated with the probability of reoffending 
(or, more accurately, the probability of being caught and convicted for 
reoffending). An example is the Offender Group Reconviction Scale [OGRS] 
(Copas and Marshall, 1998). A second type of risk assessment tool, exemplified 
by the Psychopathy Checklist, Screening Version [PCL-SV] (Hart, Cox and Hare, 
1995), focuses on mental states presumed to give rise to offending. Thirdly, risk 
assessment inventories, such as the frequently cited Historical, Clinical and Risk 
Management Scales [HCR-20] (Webster, et al., 1997), assess an eclectic mix of 
biographical, psychological and environmental risk factors.  
 
The HCR-20 is widely used to assess the risk of violent reoffending, in the USA 
(Vitacco et al., 2012), UK (Dolan and Blattner, 2010) and elsewhere. It is 
intended as an aid to holistic risk assessment rather than as a numerical 
decision-tool. Nevertheless, scores will influence patients’ fates. Follow-up 
research (Gray et al., 2004) found that about 75% of discharged forensic mental 
health patients whose HCR-20 scores placed them in the higher risk group were 
reconvicted for major or minor offences over a three year periodiv, compared with 
17% in the lower risk group. Unfortunately, less accuracy was obtained for much 
less frequent major offences, the issue of actual concern, than for minor ones.  
Gray et al. (2004) concluded that the historical and risk management scales of 
the HCR-20 offer moderate predictive accuracy, whilst this and other clinical 
scales which assess psychological factors have virtually no prognostic power. 
Gray et al. (2007) also found that the clinical (psychological) HCR-20 scale 
predicted reoffending more accurately for patients with learning disabilities than 
for those with mental disorders. This difference might be associated with whether 
patients are capable of presenting themselves strategically in order to manage 
perceptions of their riskiness. The issue of informational manoeuvring will be 
picked up in the Data Analysis section. 
 
The pattern of findings discussed above demonstrates an inverse relationship 
between the probabilistic predictive value of scales and their usefulness for risk 
management purposes. Half of the HCR-20 items reference unalterable historical 
factorsv. Patients who wish to reduce their measured riskiness, i.e. assessed 
probability of reoffending, may need to work extra-hard in order to compensate 
for a poor score on this largest sub-scale. The distinction between the HCR-20 
clinical and risk management scales is not conceptually clear. But the former 
appears to cover mostly the personal factors which forensic and other mental 
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health services are primarily oriented towards dealing with, whilst the latter 
mainly addresses the environment which patients will return to. As with historical 
factors, the patient has hardly any control over the living conditions which they 
will be sent back tovi. Staff can do little to influence these risk factors on account 
of organisational fissures between secure and community services (Davies et al., 
2006). Moreover, the perceived riskiness of discharged forensic mental health 
patients can itself impede their community integration (Coffey, 2012). 
 
The predictive power of tools designed to measure the probability of forensic 
mental health patients reoffending thus appears to be inversely related to their 
risk management usefulness. The best predictors, derived from recorded history, 
are therapeutically immutable, and the second best indicators, associated with 
the return environment, are in practice little easier to modify. Moreover, these risk 
factors work better prognostically for more frequent minor offences than for the 
less common major ones which are of primary societal concern. The task at hand 
for forensic mental health services charged with the rehabilitation of offenders is 
to identify those who have acquired an acceptably lower probability of future 
offending despite carrying a troubled history and having to return to criminogenic 
environments. The inductive prevention paradox makes this task particularly 
difficult. Consideration of presumed personal risk factors such as ‘negative 
attitude’ in the HCR-20 brings the analysis back to the question of how 
practitioners attempt to assess reoffending propensity in a secure environment. 
The research discussed below aimed to explore patient and provider navigation 
of this risk assessment task, taking into account reactive processes such as 
patient attempts to act in ways which lead to them being  judged safer and staff 
efforts to see through presumed self-presentation endeavours. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The qualitative data discussed below were drawn from two studies concerned 
with patient and staff perspectives on risk management for offenders categorised 
as having mental health problems. A third project completed more recently at a 
second medium to low security institution in London (Reynolds, 2011) will not be 
discussed further in this paper. Fieldwork for the first two studies was carried out 
some time ago, in the period 1999-2003, but similarities with the findings of the 
third study, completed in 2009, suggests that the micro risk management 
environment may not have changed much since the first two studies were 
undertaken. The two studies drawn on in the present paper were located in two 
UK medium to low secure residential institutions, one catering for offenders with 
learning disabilities, and the other for those with mental health problems, situated 
in Northern England and London respectively.  
 
These residential institutions, which offer a range of security levels, can be 
viewed as ‘risk escalators’ (Heyman, Buswell-Griffiths and Taylor, 2002; Heyman 
et al., 2004). This organisational form of care is informed by a psycho-logic, not 
always clearly articulated, in which patients are supposed to travel through 
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progressively lower levels of security towards discharge as their assessed 
riskiness is judged to decline in response to therapeutic interventions. Patients 
can also be sent back up the risk escalator if their progress is considered to have 
reversed. Such a stepped approach confronts the inductive prevention paradox 
at each stage, but gives rise to accountability issues most acutely at the point 
when a patient re-enters the public realm. 
 
Approval from a UK NHS Ethics Committee was obtained for each project. The 
studies were designed to explore patient and staff perceptions of risk 
assessment and management in relation to the discharge. Additional information 
about the two research sites is provided below. Each study was conducted in two 
stages, with general staff interviews followed by detailed data collection focussed 
on individual patients. The first stage interviews explored general staff 
perceptions of risk management within the hospital and in relation to decision-
making about discharge. Second stage data collection included, as far as 
possible, two interviews with selected patients over a 6-20 month period, an 
interview with a staff member who knew them, and, in the second study, 
observation of ward rounds and case conferences. Patients were identified 
through staff and drawn from a range of security levels. Their perspectives do not 
necessarily represent those of the patient population, but they offered a wide 
variety of views about residential life and progress towards discharge. Patient 
interviews lasted 60-90 minutes, and those with staff about 45 minutes.  
 
A grounded theory approach to design, data collection and analysis (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998) was adopted, with data collection and analysis undertaken 
concurrently so that subsequent interviews could take up emergent issues. 
Transcribed data, mainly interviews, were analysed thematically (open coding), 
properties of themes and their interrelationships mapped through constant 
comparison (axial coding), and the analysis organised around a core category 
(selective coding), the operation of risk escalators, as outlined above. Within this 
framework, key issues were identified for analysis, including divergent views 
about the nature of ‘the problem’ (Davies et al., 2006), multidisciplinary teamwork 
(Shaw et al., 2007) and probabilistic risk assessment, the focus of the present 
paper. Further details about the two research sites and data collection in each 
are provided below. 
 
The forensic learning disabilities study 
 
Data collection was undertaken during 1999-2000 in an NHS residential facility 
catering for offenders with learning disabilities. This institution offers a range of 
security levels from medium secure to unlocked houses. It is located in a rural 
area of Northern England, several miles away from the nearest town, spreads 
over a substantial area in its own campus, and has gradually evolved as 
buildings were added. The campus contains a range of architectural styles 
including an ultra-modern medium secure unit sealed off by a visually 
unobtrusive system of electronic locks, family houses formerly in domestic 
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usage, and low rise pre-1945 brick buildings commonly found in UK asylums. 
Senior staff members stated that the overall structure with its varied security 
levels had evolved over time, rather than having been planned. 
  
In the first of the two study phases, interviews were carried out with 13 staff 
members (two consultant psychiatrists, two clinical psychologists, one forensic 
service manager, three unit managers, three nurses, one social worker and one 
occupational worker). No staff member declined to be interviewed. The second 
study phase involved case studies of 11 patients, nine men and two women, 
selected randomly from units with different levels of security. As far as possible, 
case studies included two interviews with each patient and an interview with a 
staff member who knew them. One additional patient opted not to participate in 
the initial interview, and two patients could not be re-interviewed. The above 
patients, and a nurse involved in the care of each (nine nurses in total), were 
interviewed in a private location on the hospital site. Patients were subsequently 
re-interviewed in order to explore their perceptions about their progress. The time 
gap between first and second interviews averaged eight months, with a range of 
4-11 months. 
 
The forensic mental health study 
 
The second study was modelled on the one outlined above, and was undertaken 
in a forensic mental health medium to low security hospital, with data collected in 
2000-2003. This institution is located in a deprived inner-city area of London, and 
has a large proportion of patients and staff from diverse ethnic minorities. The 
pre-planned facility was originally designed to look municipal rather than prison-
like, in keeping with the ideas put forward in the Butler and Reed reports. 
However, during the mid-2000s, the facility was surrounded by a high mesh 
fence. A bizarre visual combination was thus created. This shift may reflect 
changes in the patient population as more serious offenders have been admitted, 
but may also have been driven by oscillating public attitudes towards mentally 
disordered offenders. 
 
In the first stage of data collection, 43 interviews with general managers (2), 
qualified (19) and unqualified (7) nurses, psychologists (3), occupational 
therapists (3), social workers (3) and doctors (6) were carried out. The sample 
included senior and frontline staff working in residential and community settings. 
All but one of the managers and medical staff who were approached consented 
to be interviewed. Front-line staff were recruited through requests to volunteer, 
and were therefore self-selected. Nurses on one ward expressed suspicion about 
the purpose of the project and declined to become involved in the first stage 
general interviews, although one of these nurses agreed to participate in a case 
study.  
 
The second study stage involved intensive case studies with 10 patients 
identified by staff. Data collection included, where possible, two interviews with 
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each patient, the second undertaken after 11-20 months, an interview with a staff 
member involved in the individual’s care, and observation of case conferences. 
Four additional identified patients were not included, two because they declined, 
and two for clinical reasons. One interviewed patient declined consent for a staff 
member to be interviewed about his case, and one staff member refused to 
participate in case studies. Sixteen staff were interviewed about specific patients, 
providing staff views for nine of the 10 case studies. Two case conferences have 
been attended and recorded, and five patients have been revisited for a progress 
update. Of the other five patients, four were discharged during the study period, 
and one died.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis will be presented in two sections: firstly discussing staff and patient 
perceptions relating to the inductive prevention paradox; and, secondly, 
considering staff efforts to overcome this problem in relation to patients’ attempts 
to manage their own assessed riskiness. 
 
The inductive prevention paradox and risk assessment 
 
Data analysis suggests that assessment of the probability of patients reoffending 
is pervaded by uncertainty. This uncertainty can be contrasted with the official 
purpose of medium to low secure institutions, articulated in the Butler and Reed 
reports, discussed above, of providing  a setting similar to that of the external 
world in which risks can be properly assessed. However, one very senior 
manager, exceptionally, did express confidence in this mission. 
 
We should take somebody who has committed an offence while they have 
been unwell - bring them in here and be able to - it could be that it is 
homicide, but bring them in here and treat them, and be able to put them 
back in the community somewhere around eighteen months to two years. 
(General manager, forensic mental health unit) 
 
As illustrated below, staff who worked closer to direct patient care often 
communicated considerably less confidence that rational decisions about 
discharge risks could be made. This comparison suggests the hypothesis that 
those who occupy role positions close to the top of the organisation may, like 
report and inquiry authors, be more likely to accept the validity of its official 
mission than those lower down the hierarchy. The latter are engaged with, and 
accountable for, risk management in individual cases. One ward manager, 
discussing discharge decision-making believed that ‘it’s more luck than anything’. 
 
I think that we’re such a mixture here of people and patients with difficulties. 
We’re now dealing with someone with such an extensive forensic history, 
and such complex needs, that often there’s no clear evidence that things 
have moved forward. (Ward manager, forensic mental health unit) 
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The same respondent contrasted the complexity of the processes giving rise to 
reoffending with the simplification embedded in standardised operational 
procedures. 
 
If someone’s worked well within the Home Office [requirements], and had 
their 12 community trips, and everything has gone according to Home Office 
plan, but there’s still huge anxieties. Because the traits of the personality 
were, are, still in place, then the doctor will, may well, the team will turn 
round and say, you know, ‘He can go to low secure’ … But he’d done 
everything by the book ... If he has done everything by the book then he will 
be discharged. (Ward manager, forensic mental health unit) 
 
This analysis suggests that the forensic health care system responds to the 
inductive prevention paradox by proceduralising risks which cannot be otherwise 
assessed. Patients who comply, enabling the appropriate boxes to be ticked, are 
deemed safe enough for discharge. Such a critique points to a gap between 
official riskiness assessment and the unknown probability of reoffending. The 
respondent further argues that uncertainty  is mitigated, at least for those making 
the decision to move a patient down the risk escalator, by the transfer of risk 
ownershipvii to others, a tactic which attempts to separate risk management 
decision-making from accountability of subsequent adverse events. 
 
 They would transfer responsibility to going back into the community and to 
another RMO [responsible medical officer] which, with this particular chap’s 
history, [would mean] a huge chance he will offend again. (Ward manager, 
forensic mental health unit)   
 
As the next quotation suggests, one of the strongest demand characteristics 
(Orne, 1962) of the forensic mental health care environment is for patient 
compliance (Davies et al., 2008) which can become confounded with reduced 
riskiness. 
 
Patients get worn down really, not really being cared for. But you’re [patients 
are] beating your head against the wall so many times, so you just accept 
what’s going on. It’s not really that you become all that better. You’ve just 
accepted what’s going on … I think it’s just a case of getting used to the 
environment, or the rules and regulations. (Charge nurse, forensic mental 
health unit) 
 
Most patients learnt, sooner or later, to go along with what was required of them. 
Some, but not all, conflated learning to conform with recovering from their 
presumed mental disorder, and, by implication, becoming less likely to reoffend 
after discharge. 
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Well, I suppose I played the game the right way, you know … That’s to keep 
quiet and wait, you know, to get better. (Forensic mental health patient) 
 
This patient had become stuck in the system until a nurse ‘frankly’ spelt out what 
was required.  
 
The nurse told us quite frankly that this [compliance] is the gateway, the 
doorway to freedom, you know … And I appreciated that, you know. 
(Forensic mental health patient) 
 
De facto operational reliance on inducing conformity as a means of attempting to 
reduce riskiness raises two linked issues. Firstly, patients may be discharged 
simply because they have learnt to meet the expectations of staff who manage 
secure environments. Compliance can be used as an operational indicator of 
lowered riskiness, but its association to a reduced probability of reoffending 
remains conjectural and unexamined. The patient quoted below believed that sex 
offenders could ‘run’ through the system even though their underlying propensity 
to offend had not been tackled. 
 
What makes me mad about this place, right, is the fact that, like I say, 
people running through the system and all that, right … And then you've 
got, like, on a Saturday, they go down to [local town] by themselves. And 
owt could happen. Anything's [i.e. children are] around on Saturday. 
(Forensic learning disabilities patient) 
 
Qualitative research cannot demonstrate the extent to which compliance speeds 
up release. Nevertheless, this example does illustrate a concern about the 
validity of risk assessment comparable to that discussed by the ward manager 
quoted above.  
 
Conversely, patients who do not comply with staff expectations may find that 
their progress is blocked, even though the relationship between issues arising in 
this environment and reoffending in the outside world is problematic. For 
example, consultants expressed alarm at the behaviour of a one forensic mental 
health patient  who had taken hair clippers around other wards without 
permission, hoping to earn money as an amateur barber. In a community 
context, this activity might be viewed as commendably entrepreneurial. In the 
forensic environment it was seen as an indicator of serious riskiness.  
 
A major cause of patients’ actions leading to them being marked out as risky was 
failure in managing expressions of anger. The significance of such displays 
depends on their meaningful context, in both everyday life and the forensic 
environment. The patient quoted below felt that a trivial action had been wrongly 
classified as a riskiness indicator. 
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I walked across to the table, the pool table, tapped on the top of it, and 
she [the nurse] wrote down that I was feeling aggressive, and that, and all 
things like that. And I just thought, ‘Well, one tap on the table’. I thought 
that was entirely wrong. So I said. She discussed it. It came out in the 
ward round that, she wrote that, which was wrong, out of order. (Forensic 
mental health patient) 
 
This patient felt that he had merely been indicating that his right to a turn at the 
pool table was being violated. The expansion ‘and all things like that’ conveys a 
sense that an edifice of risk reasoning was being built on a misreading of a single 
observation about an action which would not register as a risk indicator 
elsewhere. By overtly challenging this interpretation, the patient may have further 
harmed his discharge prospects. A propensity for mental health professionals to 
interpret everyday behaviours in terms of pathological labels (Rosenhan, 1973) is 
well-documented, but takes on new forms within a risk assessment framework. 
Patients and staff occupy an enclosed, highly frustrating environment in which 
interpersonal conflict may be expected. In addition, patients may be subjected to 
minute observation designed to determine the probability of them reoffending. 
This combination of close confinement and total risk assessment may obscure 
the issue of primary concern, namely the likelihood of a patient harming others 
after discharge. 
 
A final illustrative example of contested risk assessment is of particular interest 
because it illustrates how a patient’s direct statement of an intention to offend 
can be discounted within a medical interpretive framework. 
 
He [patient] said that he wanted to [commit serious offences]. And they still 
let him go because he turned round and said, ‘Well, I made it all up. I just 
wanted to go and see my mum’ … So, you know, as a nursing team, the 
day before, we had sat around just kind of gob-smacked that the consultant 
had said that he could go … I would not escort him. (Health care assistant, 
forensic mental health unit) 
  
This patient’s tactic may have worked because the consultant viewed his 
behaviour as symptomatic of illness, and ‘prescribed’ a home visit. When asked 
why the consultant had agreed to his parole, a decision which the above 
respondent depicted  as ‘complete madness’, she cited the reason given in the 
patient’s medical notes, namely ‘to allay his [patient’s] anxiety’. Outside forensic 
mental health settings, people often make threats, such as ‘I will kill you’ which 
are not intended or taken literally. The forensic context frames such statement as 
potentially threatening. Health professionals are faced with the task of 
differentiating serious statements of intent from merely metaphorical threats. In 
this case, doctors felt that they knew the patient well enough to rule out real risk 
of offending. However, if the patient had harmed someone whilst on leave, they 
would have been held to account by judges of responsible risk-taking. 
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Strategies for managing the inductive prevention paradox  
 
Some staff and patients expressed concern about the problematic validity of risk 
assessments, as illustrated above. In general, the data suggest that, not 
surprisingly, staff gave more attention to reducing the risk of released patients 
reoffending than they did to that of detaining patients unnecessarily. Three 
strategies which staff adopted in order to detect presumed underlying personal 
riskiness are discussed below: discounting good behaviour; mini-trials; and 
formalised risk assessment.  
 
Discounting good behaviour 
 
Given that patients mostly want to be released as early as possible, they might 
be expected to attempt to act in ways which would reduce their assessed 
riskiness. Staff, in turn, might try to see through such attempts at self-
presentation in order to minimise the risk of released patients reoffending. One 
forensic learning disabilities worker, discussing this issue, said that male patients 
would be asked questions designed to test their truthfulness such as whether 
they would look at a woman with large breasts! Staff described covertly 
observing a forensic learning disabilities patient who had committed offences 
involving children when he went to a swimming pool in order to see if he showed 
an inappropriate interest in them. This approach, an informal version of 
personality test ‘lie scales’, provides an obviously fragile method for checking 
patient veracity. A psychiatrist indicated that staff might deliberately withhold 
revealing the purpose behind an activity involving a patient so that it could be 
used as a test of their inclination to reoffend. The ‘star patient’, discussed next, 
was seen as operating a policy designed to make his mental health appear as 
good as possible, and thereby maximise his prospects of early release. 
 
Every time I stop, ‘Oh I’m fine, I’m alright’. ‘Have you got anything you are 
worried about?’ ‘No.’ … He’s all pleasant. He looks normal ... We know he 
is the ‘star patient’ and everything, but [laughs] we have to watch him, 
[given] what he did before, you know. (Nurse, forensic mental health unit) 
 
The patient’s conduct was viewed as too good to be true. This suspicion was 
framed by awareness of the seriousness of his previous offending, illustrating the 
difficulty which patients experienced about compensating for historical risk 
indicators, as discussed above in relation to risk assessment tools. Patients 
faced with this bind may adopt a more subtle approach, first ‘faking bad’ so that 
their subsequent conversion to low riskiness might appear more credible. 
Mulvey, the fictitious nineteenth century prisoner described in the opening 
quotation from Star of the Sea employed just this tactic. 
 
Mini-trials 
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Testing through mini-trials involves allowing a small temporary increase in 
autonomy in the hope of assessing the probability of future reoffending more 
accurately, whilst limiting the risk of it actually occurring. Success can be built on 
progressively, for instance by lengthening parole periods. This strategy had been 
adopted with the ‘star patient’ discussed above. 
 
Nurse: I personally think, when he [‘star patient’] goes out [on parole], that’s 
a big test for him, because he goes out on a Saturday to [large town], and 
[large town] is quite far, and anything can happen then … If something really 
pushed him, he would do something. (Nurse, forensic mental health unit) 
 
The quotation brings out the two features of mini-trials mentioned above, that 
they provide a somewhat more realistic test of riskiness than can be managed in 
the secure environment, but only at the price of accepting a chance that the 
patient might reoffend during the test period. The strategy can be compared to 
that traditionally adopted for inductively testing the safety of novel foods by eating 
progressively larger amounts. Its limitations can easily be identified, and will be 
considered further in the Discussion. As the above respondent indicates, a risk of 
immediate disaster is inescapably incurred. Conversely, patients might conceal 
their offending proclivity until permanently discharged. 
 
Formalised risk assessment 
 
Tools such as the HCR-20 which are used to assess reoffending risk can also 
take on a symbolic function. This way of ‘managing’ risk assessment is illustrated 
by the following extract derived from observation of a ward round. The consultant 
quoted made the comment cited below after a lengthy discussion concerning 
difficulties arising from the actions of a female patient, including conflicts about 
bathing and money matters, and accusations directed at male staff. 
 
Consultant: What risk assessment was done. The pink thing [risk 
assessment form]? Do we need to assign numbers? [Senior house officer 
reads out numbers from the ward round summary.] Make a point of noting 
risk to others on the ward round minutes and notes. We need to be vigilant.  
[Moves on to next patient.] (Ward round, forensic mental health unit) 
 
The reading out of probability ‘numbers’ combined with an admonition to be 
‘vigilant’ conveys a sense that an authoritative, scientifically rational resolution 
has been achieved, even though it skirts over their problematic meaning.  
 
Measuring patient progress towards a level of riskiness which would justify their 
discharge relies on observing their behaviour. However, many of the issues 
which arise in a secure setting bear little relation to those which would be of 
concern outside and visa versa. The validity of the whole process depends upon 
assuming either that patients are ‘judgemental dopes’ (Garfinkel, 1967) who are 
presumed not to take into account the anticipated implications of their actions for 
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risk assessment, or that their self-presentation strategies can be penetrated 
through information games or psychometrics. The information management 
issues identified by Garfinkel and Goffman (1959/1970) half a century ago have 
now taken on new forms in relation to probabilistic risk assessment. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
It has been argued in this paper that the rationality of risk assessment is 
undermined by the operation of the inductive prevention paradox. In relation to 
the specific example discussed, forensic mental health service providers are 
expected to assess the probability of a patient harming others in the future after 
discharge by obtaining observational ‘evidence’ in a present environment 
designed to prevent just such events from occurring. They are required to answer 
the question of how, if at all, a patient’s riskiness has been changed by long-term 
incarceration, even though the inductive prevention paradox cuts off the supply of 
‘evidence and rigorous analysis’ (South West London Strategic Health Authority, 
2006, p.9) which those who conduct retrospective inquiries often assume to be 
readily available. As Warner (2006) has argued, inquiries have acquired the 
function of modern allegories, precautionary tales which fuel organisational 
defensive practices oriented towards minimising reputational risks (Rothstein, 
2006). Their role as risk owners puts staff into a bind which they struggle to 
manage. They lack an inductive evidence base for probability estimation, but risk 
condemnation if a discharged patient seriously reoffends.  
 
The ultimate source of this bind is the prevailing cultural assumption that science 
can banish risk. This unfulfillable promise (Hansson, 1993) comes up against a 
double limitation: that probabilistic reasoning does not preclude the occurrence of 
adverse events; and that prevention blocks out risk managers’ views of the most 
relevant evidence. Official probabilistic reasoning based on induction from 
observed rates entails heuristic acceptance of the ecological fallacy (Rose, 
1981). This approach to prediction requires the assumption to be made that each 
member of a constructed category or sub-category ‘carries’ its aggregate 
proportion of adverse events, (and the further presupposition that such historic 
rates provide a good guide to the future). But risk managers considering offender 
discharge are expected to make correct predictions in individual cases rather 
than for patient categories, somehow allowing for preventative measures 
currently in place and discounting patients’ attempts to influence their risk 
assessment (Dixon, 2012). 
 
The inductive prevention paradox can be escaped from if proxy measures 
associated with the probability of the outcome of concern, but unaffected by the 
operating preventative measures, can be identified. Unfortunately, the prognostic 
need for such measures does is not matched by their availability. The limitations 
of the ‘tools’ available for risk assessment in a forensic mental health context 
were reviewed in the Introduction. It was noted that the best predictor, offending 
history, adds no predictive value with respect to changes in the probability of a 
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patient reoffending; that staff in practice have little sight or control of the post-
discharge environment, the second-best predictor; and that the psychological 
factors which forensic mental health services are oriented to changing offer no 
predictive valueviii. In practice, peaceably serving time as a patient may serve as 
the main de facto approach to risk reduction, as articulated by the patient, quoted 
above, who had taken on board the advice ‘to keep quiet and wait, you know, to 
get better’ix.  
 
The efforts of forensic mental health service providers to compensate for this 
prognostic limitation were obviously flawed. Their strategies included trying to 
see through patient self-presentations, using mini-trials, and relying on the 
illusory precision of numerical risk assessments. Although the information games 
required for the first two tactics were depicted long ago, the inmates of the 
asylums  observed by Goffman (1961/1991) were not subjected to constant risk 
assessment as they would be today. In the heyday of asylums, staff stripped 
‘dangerous’ patients (Castel, 1991) of identities which they considered defective 
in order to rebuild them. This form of governmentality has been replaced by one 
framed in terms of risk. Patients are sifted through a probabilistic filter which is 
designed to allow only acceptably safe individuals to pass through to the world 
outside. Adoption of this interpretive framework can lead to the creation of new 
forms of bureaucratically driven risk-blindness (Godin et al., 2006) underpinned 
by faith in probability ‘numbers’ generated by ‘tools’. Mini-trials have the merit of 
being tailored to the specific risks which concern staff, and may offer some 
prognostic utility with respect to countering the obscuring effect of the inductive 
prevention paradox. However, their limitations must not be lost sight of. Patients 
who are determined to reoffend may do so during the brief window of opportunity 
offered by a mini-trial, consciously bide their time until monitoring is relaxed in 
response to a successful mini-trial, or find that they cannot refrain from 
reoffending over a longer time-frame.  
 
The inductive prevention paradox is particularly likely to trap decision-making in 
an evidence-impoverished virtual bubble when the contingency of concern is 
culturally abhorred, as in the case of ‘mad’ or ‘dirty’ offences against the person, 
concern about which is fuelled to a greater or lesser extent by media 
amplification in different countries. However, other more or less emotionally 
charged examples can easily be identified. The most direct comparison is with 
prisoners attempting to negotiate release via parole boards who report similar 
concerns about informational game-playing to those illustrated in the present 
paper (Muhammad, 1996).  
 
More broadly, anyone who has taken preventative measures faces the question 
of what damage might result from lifting them. Although prophylaxis can be 
resumed if necessary, its reapplication might not erase irreversible 
consequences of  temporary withdrawal. For example, a frail older person who 
has decided that going out alone is too risky might suffer a serious injury if they 
tried to test their current capabilities. Similarly, a person living with depression 
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might commit suicide if they stopped taking medication; and a Crone’s disease 
sufferer might experience uncontrollable flare-ups if they abandoned anti-
inflammatory drugs for a trial period. As with incarcerated mental health patients, 
preventative measures may themselves change risk conditions in ways which are 
hard to assess. An older person who has confined themselves to their home for a 
lengthy period might become more vulnerable to falls through lack of practice if 
they do eventually go out. Similarly, the long-term anti-depressant user might 
experience withdrawal symptoms from these addictive substances, or suffer long 
term psycho-physiological damage. Unless they remove protective measures, 
thereby facing the risk of irreversible damage, individuals in these predicaments 
cannot know whether they are still necessary or notx.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Policy-makers and practitioners are entitled to ask how they should be expected  
to respond to the difficulties arising from the inductive prevention paradox. Four 
constructive suggestions can be drawn from the present analysis, and are 
outlined briefly below along with the formidable barriers to their achievement.  
 
Firstly, societal expectations about the potential of risk assessment in this and 
other domains in which probabilistic inductive inference is obscured by 
prophylaxis could be lowered. In theory, the prevailing de facto blame culture 
could be replaced by one which allows for positive risk-taking (Titterton, 2005). 
However, as noted, mass media approaches to crime which fuel defensive 
practices appear to be associated with wider structural factors such as 
fragmented media ownership and conflictual politics which cannot easily be 
modified (Walgrave and Sadicaris, 2009). Secondly, patients could be actively 
engaged in an open risk assessment process (Langan and Lindow, 2004), rather 
than being deceived in order to try to prevent them from concealing their ‘real’ 
riskiness. This approach would require a substantial shift towards trusting 
patients as ‘service-users’, and might not allow those who are determined to 
conceal their intention to re-offend to be identified. But it would, at best, enable 
patients and staff to collaborate rather than play risk assessment information 
games which rely on concealment. Thirdly, top-down moralising about poor inter-
agency and multi-professional collaboration could be replaced by serious 
attempts to analyse the organisational reasons why such failures endlessly recur, 
particularly the often underestimated barriers to multidisciplinary collaboration 
(Shaw et al., 2007). Risk systems theory (Japp and Kusche, 2008) provides one 
useful starting point for analysing such barriers by postulating that organised 
groups unreflectively construct and orient to distinctive risk objects. Finally, 
serious attempts to address the environments which offenders return to (Mullen, 
2000; Brett et al., 2007; Coffey, 2012) would complement the present focus on 
assessing and reducing personal riskiness. Although currently inhibited by 
economic, organisational and political barriers, multidisciplinary attention to the 
quality of the lives which forensic mental health patients will return to perhaps 
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offers the most promising but also challenging approach to their safer 
rehabilitation.  
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i
 The ‘inductive prevention paradox’ should be distinguished from the widely discussed 
‘prevention paradox’ (Rose, 1981) which arises from attributing a risk associated with an 
aggregate category such as alcohol consumption to individuals who meet the specified criteria for 
category membership. Both paradoxes are bound up with the limitations of probabilistic thinking. 
But the latter, which could be termed the ‘ecological prevention paradox’, derives from the 
requirement to shift between the aggregate and the individual in order to quantify probabilities 
(Heyman et al., 1998; Hunt, 2003). The inductive prevention paradox results from limitations in 
the observational evidence base in individual cases. 
ii
 The extent and nature of media crime coverage varies across countries. One comparative study 
of 11 countries (Walgrave and Sadicaris, 2009) concluded that the proportion of national TV 
news-time devoted to this topic was positively associated with higher crime rates, greater media 
fragmentation and competition, and stronger political polarisation. The UK was found to have 
some of the highest percentages of TV news items concerned with crime, nearly double those for 
France, together with a particularly strong slant towards personalistic accounts of violent 
offending. (The USA had an unexpectedly low rate of crime coverage which, the authors suggest, 
may have resulted from selecting national rather than more frequently used local TV stations.) A 
febrile media culture, reinforced by the predominance of crime as a TV drama theme and political 
competition to be ‘tough on crime’, leaves UK forensic mental health services facing a particularly 
difficult risk management dilemma. 
iii
 Tools direct selective service attention to particular adverse events, in this case the risk of 
reoffending as against, for example, becoming depressed or being attacked by members of the 
‘community’. They thereby carry implicit value judgements (Heyman, 2012). 
iv
 Probabilities can only be quantified in relation to a temporal horizon, in this case three years, 
beyond which adverse events are not taken into account. Practically focused risk managers tend 
to frame time unreflectively. 
v
 More accurately, the probability of a patient reoffending is related to recorded history. Patients 
can influence their ‘history’ in this sense, for example by concealing previous offending. However, 
once their offending history has been encoded in a patient record, patients are cannot change it, 
unless they can demonstrate their innocence, a very unlikely possibility for those who have 
committed offences against the person. 
vi
 Discharged patients may be directed away from localities associated with former offending. 
However, they will thereby also be separated from social networks and familiar surroundings. 
They tend to be discharged into areas of serious socio-economic deprivation which are 
associated with additional problems such as high crime rates and drug problems. 
vii
 The concept of risk ownership originated in corporate governance where it is used to convey a 
top-down model of social order in which a senior manager at board level is made accountable for 
each risk which the organisation is deemed to face. As with the idea of risk management, the 
notion can be applied more generally to everyday life. For example, in the forensic mental health 
sphere, close relatives may decline to take back responsibility for a discharged offender (Heyman 
et al., 2010, p. 34). 
viii
 A parallel debate  has taken place in the criminal justice system, with advocacy of a ‘tool’ for 
assessing reoffending risk, the Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R) challenged by sceptics 
(Gendreau, Goggin and Smith, 2002). 
ix
 As this example illustrates, the ‘lens of risk’ may give a new frame for interpreting the social 
organisation of patient hospital stays (Roth, 1963), in which the passage of time is seen to 
somehow reduce riskiness. 
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x
 Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) can provide counterfactual evidence at an aggregate level. 
For instance, patients in the placebo group can be expected to have done as well on average as 
those in the treatment group if they had received an experimental drug. However, this aggregated 
knowledge offers limited predictive accuracy in individual cases, and the methodology of RCTs is 
difficult or impossible to apply with respect to long-term, complex interventions. 
